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and 
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Abstract 
Research in the area of capital market efficiency with respect to information 
generally considers only the two conclusions that the market is efficient or 
it is.not efficient; information is either instantaneously reflected in prices 
or it is not. We investigate a market structure in which individual traders 
may require differential time lags to respond to new information, either be-
cause of time lags in acquiring the information or because of differences in 
ability to process received information quickly. In the context of this mar-
ket, we argue that the dichotomous view of efficiency versus inefficiency is 
not useful; rather it is meaningful to measure the relative efficiency of the 
market. We develop a measure of relative market inefficiency and investigate 
properties of the measure. Then we consider economic determinants of the de-
gree of market inefficiency and review our measure of inefficiency against the 
criteria proposed by Goldman and Sosin (1979). 
1. Introduction 
An efficient1 capital market is a market in which prices adjust 'quickly' 
to ' fully reflect' all 'available' information. This seems to be the general-
ly accepted interpretation of the pathbreaking work by Fama (1970). Since 
that time, financial economists have struggled to more clearly define the con-
cept of efficiency. The research efforts of those economists is justified by 
the fact that the allocation of income and wealth in the financial market and, 
indeed, the economic properties of the overall economy, are at least to some 
ext.ent affected by the information efficiency of capital markets. 2 
This paper represents an effort to better understand the elusive concept 
of market efficiency. We consider a market structure in which information is 
gradually diffused into the market. With the exception of Goldman and Sosin 
(1979), previous research in capital market efficiency has paid little at ten-
tion to the process by which information is disseminated into the market. We 
consider a market structure which allows for the gradual diffusion of new 
data. Our model permits us to explicitly consider the time dimension of the 
price adjustment process, a factor ignored even by Goldman and Sosin. Within 
this framework, we argue that the traditional designation of a market as ei-
ther efficient or inefficient is inadequate. We then develop a measure of 
relative market efficiency. With this capability we can gauge the degree of 
inefficiency. 
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The remainder of the paper is divided into six sections. Following this 
brief introduction is a review of existing theoretical investigations into in-
formation efficiency. Included is a discussion of the perceived limitations 
of this prior work. Section three describes the market structure employed in 
our analysis. In the fourth section we offer an intentionally traditional 
definition of market efficiency which is consistent with gradual information 
dissemination. After positing this definition we demonstrate the problem as-
sociated with its application. 
Subsequent to this traditional efficiency analysis, we introduce a mea-
sure of relative efficiency. Section five defines the metric and examines 
some of its characteristics. In the sixth section we investigate the effects 
of several important economic variables on our measure of inefficiency. The 
paper closes with a summary of our findings and points towards needed future 
research. 
2. Previous Definitions of Market Efficiency 
Much of the theoretical and empirical work on market efficiency in recent 
years draws upon the framework exposited by Fama (1970). In order to 
operationalize the notion that prices "fully reflect" information, Fama posits 
an expectations model to describe the market's use of information: 
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Thus Fama asserts that the price expected to prevail next period ( t+l) for as-
set j conditional on the information set this period ('t) is equal to one plus 
the expected rate of return times the asset's current price. Implicit in this 
definition is that, whatever the return generating process, the information 
set 't is fully utilized in determining expected returns. Fama's work implies 
investors should not, on average, be able to earn excess profits by trading 
on the information in 't • 
Fama also proposes a set of conditions sufficient to imply market effi-
ciency. These are: (1) a frictionless market; (2) costless information which 
is equally available to all market participants; and (3) homogenous beliefs. 
Fama points out that these conditions are ~ necessary and a market may still 
be efficient with 'some' violation of each condition. 
In response to criticism of his earlier definition, Fama (1976a), (1976b) 
offers an alternative interpretation of market efficiency. He suggests a two 
step price formation process. On the basis of the information set used by 
m 
'the market' to set prices at time t, 't' 'the market' assesses a joint 
m 
probability distribution of security prices at time (t+l), fm(Pt+ll't), where 
Pt+l = (Pl,t+l,P2, t+l, ••• , Pn,t+l) is the vector of security prices at time 
t+1. 3 From this joint distribution and an assumed model of equilibrium re-
turns, the market determines current prices. Market efficiency implies that 
m 
the market uses all relevant information in determining prices, 't = 't, and 
that the market assessed distribution equals the 'true' distribution, 
fm(Pt+ll~~) a f(Pt+ll~t)• 
Fama's work provides an intuitive description of the notion of informa-
tion efficiency and the impetus ·for most of the empirical efficiency work. 
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His definition of efficiency, however, has some conceptual difficulties. Fama 
offers no explanation of why the market might ignore some information in 
m 
determining prices, i.e., why ~t * ~t· In addition, the idea of a 'true' 
distribution for security returns seems to imply the existence of an 'intrin-
sic value' for ~hat security which is independent of the beliefs and prefer-
ences of the market participants. Finally, Fama's efficiency definition re-
quires some assumption concerning an equilibrium return generating model. 
Rubenstein (1975) and Beja (1976) propose action-oriented definitions of 
market efficiency. Rubinstein uses a three date (t=-0,1,2) Arrow-Debreu econo-
my to demonstrate his efficiency criterion. He is interested in efficiency 
with respect to two sets of information. New information is defined as a rev-
elation of the state of nature at t=-1. This revelation provides the traders 
with additional insight concerning the t=2 state of the world. Rubinstein's 
definition of all data includes this new information plus the individual's 
prior (time taO) subjective distribution of states. 
An individual perceives ~ information as fully reflected in price if 
and only if there is no portfolio revision at t=1. 4 The assumption of a com-
plete market removes any incentive for trading except for a revision of be-
liefs not fully offset by a change in price. Any trading at the intermediate 
date implies at least one investor does not believe prices fully reflect the 
new information. 
Other scholars have attempted to refine the concept of efficiency. Huber 
(1978) attributes the following definition to Sharpe: 
Prices fully reflect the information set ~' if prices are 
identical to the prices that would exist if ~ was made public. 
This definition (or some variant thereof) is one of the more frequently used 
definitions in the literature. Note the severity of its implications. If 
5 
even a single investor in a large market discovers some information not gener-
ally known to the market, equilibrium price must react as if everyone pos-
sessed the same data. 
The concept of efficiency may be viewed as either an ex post property of 
a series of prices or an ex ante property of a pricing process. If the pro-
fession is to empirically test the efficiency of financial markets any defini-
tion IIllSt be consistent with ex post efficiency. It is equally important, 
however, to be able to consider the ex ante efficiency of an equilibrium pric-
ing process. Huber (1978) noted the distinction. He offers the following 
definition: 
A process determining equilibrium prices and allocations 
is termed efficient with respect to an information struc-
ture if, for every possible set of signal outcomes from 
the information structure, equilibrium prices and alloca-
tions are identical to those which would be determined if 
the same set of signal outcomes had been generated by a 
public information structure. 
This definition is consistent with both ex ante and ex post notions of effi-
ciency. 
All of the studies reviewed thus far offer explicit definitions of an 
efficient market. The research examined in the remainder of this overview is 
concerned with market settings which either do or do not achieve efficiency. 
From this work are implications for the concept of information efficiency. 
Grossman and Stiglitz (1975), (1976), are interested in the efficiency 
properties of a market in which only a fraction of the market participants re-
ceive additional data and the uninfo~ed investors use market price to infer 
what they can about the information set of the informed traders. Grossman 
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and Stiglitz develop a market structure in which information is costless and 
equilibrium price is a one-to-one correspondence with the information set of 
the informed group of investors. If, through repeated observations of the 
(assumed) stationary return generating process, the uninformed learn this cor-
respondence, they can use market price to infer the information set of their 
better informed trading partners.s In this case, since every investor has the 
same information set, the market is efficient. 
Now consider the same market structure except that the new information is 
costly. If an investor chooses to become informed the traders remaining 
uninformed invert price and the market is efficient. The fact that uninformed 
individuals may 'free-ride' eliminates the incentive for any investor to pay 
to become informed. Howeve!, if no one receives the new data, market price 
cannot be efficient. Thus before a market participant has an incentive to 
obtain the new information, he must expect to earn a fair return on his 
information acquisition. This implies that equilibrium prices cannot 'fully 
reflect' all information.6 
If we introduce an additional source of randomness (besides the new in-
formation) into this basic market structure, say random endowments, there is 
no one-to-one correspondence between the informed investor's data set and 
equilibrium price. Price may be high because the news is favorable or because 
supply is low. The uninformed cannot discover the information set of the in-
formed agent with certainty. In equilibrium a fraction of the market partici-
pants choose to become informed, and at the margin, the informed investor 
earns a fair economic return on his investment in the information. 
Figlewski (1978) is interested in investigating the mechanism by which 
markets become efficient. He has the following scenario by Cootner [(1967), 
page 80] in mind. 
Given the uncertainty of the real world the many actual 
and virtual investors will have many, perhaps equally 
many, price forecasts If any group of investors was 
consist.ently better than average at forecasting price, 
they would accumulate wealth and give their forecasts 
greater and greater weight. In the process, they would 
bring the present price closer to the 'true' value. Con-
versely, investors who were worse than average in fore-
casting ability would carry less and less weight. If this 
process worked well enough, the present price would re-
flect the best information about the future in the sense 
that the present price, plus normal profits, would be the 
best estimate of future price. 
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In this view the market price is a weighted average of investors' beliefs 
where the weights are directly related to the investor's wealth. Assuming 
some minimum regularity assumptions on demand curves, there is some distribu-
tion of wealth for which the wealth weights are identical to the forecasting 
ability weights and each trader's information is correctly reflected in equi-
librium price. Figlewski finds that in the short run the actual distribution 
of wealth tends towards this efficient market distribution. Traders with in-
formation undervalued by price have expected gains while traders whose data is 
overvalued can expect losses. In the long run, however, random forecasting 
errors prevent the market from achieving the efficient market wealth distribu-
tion. -, Thus the market is efficient with probability zero. 
Figlewski is also interested in assessing the relative efficiency of his 
market setting under various assumptions about the characteristics of the 
market participants. Using the variance of current versus future market price 
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as his measure of inefficiency, Figlewski finds, through numerical analysis, 
that traders who are more risk averse and more homogeneous in their ability to 
gather and process information produce more efficient markets. 
Goldman and Sosin (1979) partition the market participants into two 
groups. One group, denoted speculators, enjoys a priority of information re-
ceipt over the other group, the ' investors. The first market setting Goldman 
and Sosin (GS) examine is one in which there is no uncertainty regarding the 
number of speculators or the amount of time which elapses before the investors 
are informed. They find that speculators may 'sit-on' the new data for some 
period of time until it is profitable to act. This type of behavior is cer-
tainly not in the best interests of market efficiency. 
The primary focus of GS is the effect of the frequency of transacting on 
market efficiency. Their measure of inefficiency (MI) is the mean square er-
ror between the price that exists when just the speculators are informed and 
the market price when everyone is informed. GS investigate the conditions 
under which their MI is minimized with continuous trading. They find that, if 
'sufficient' uncertainty surrounds the dissemination process, continuous trad-
ing is detrimental to market efficiency. 
GS examine two types of dissemination uncertainty. Type I uncertainty 
(speed of dissemination uncertainty) is the length of time after the specula-
tors receive the new data that the investors remain uninformed and type II un-
certainty (path of dissemination uncertainty) is uncertainty concerning the 
number of speculators. With only type I uncertainty GS find their MI is 
minimized when there is continuous trading. The addition of a 'sufficient' 
level of type II uncertainty implies the existence of a unique optimal time 
interval between tatonnements which minimizes their MI. Furthermore this op-
timal time interval decreases as the level of type II uncertainty decreases. 
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In summary, it seems that efficiency is typically defined in terms of the 
equivalence of certain market characteristics under alternative information 
settings. In Fama (1976 a,b) it is the equivalence of the market assessed 
distribution function and the 'true' distribution. Rubinstein (with regard to 
new information) and Beja define efficiency with regard to identical portfolio 
positions. The most popular definition involves the equivalency of prices. 
Sharpe, Goldman and Sosin, Rubinstein, Figlewski, and Grossman and Stiglitz 
all compare existing market price to 'the efficient market price.' Finally, 
Huber defines efficiency as the equivalence of both prices and portfolio posi-
tions. With the exception of Goldman and Sosin, none of these studies explic-
itly consider the manner in which hew data is disseminated to the market par-
ticipants. In order to develop a definition of market efficiency in an en-
vironment consistent with gradual information dissemination, we introduce our 
market structure in the following section. 
3. Market Structure 
Imagine a world in which expected-utility-of-wealth maximizing individ-
uals are faced with three decisions affecting wealth. They must choose a 
level of consumption, select a quantity of information activities and allocate 
their remaining funds among various investment opportunities. Some of these 
investment opportunities offer a stochastic return while others may be risk-
less. Suppose, as in Verrecchia (1980), the more an individual spends on the 
acquisition and processing of information, the more rapidly he can expect to 
react to the release of new data. 7 The new data consists of an (assumed) ex-
ogenous signal which the investor views as being informative about the re-
turn(s) of some risky security(ies). In such an economy the actions of in-
vestors naturally form a continuum along the information expenditure line. 
------ - ----------------------
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Some traders invest (relatively) large amounts in information with the expec-
tation of being able to react quickly, other individuals spend little and are 
content with less of an informational advantage. If investors' beliefs about 
the economy are rational, their expectations about their position in the dis-
semination process must be fulfilled. 8 
Thus individuals make irrevocable consumption and information related ex-
penditure decisions for the current time period and trade to an equilibrium in 
the financial security market prior to the release of additional information. 
Each individual does, however, consider the anticipated implications of the 
forthcoming information event when selecting his optimal consumption, informa-
tion and investment decisions. Subsequent to this initial equilibrium the in-
formation event occurs. This event may consist of either a public signal 
(everyone receives identical signals) or private signals. Regardless of the 
type of information investors receive, relative times are determined by the 
equilibrating process in the market for information (described in the preced-
ing paragraph). The information market equilibrium implies investors react to 
the information event sequentially until all are informed.9 
In addition to the exogenous signal we assume each investor is capable of 
using equilibrium price as a 'noisy' signal of the other investors' informa-
tion sets. This implies that as each investor receives and reacts to the ex-
ogenous signal, every investor infers as much as possible about that signal. 
To avoid problems of informative overefficiency (see Grassman-Stiglitz 
(1976)), we assume the existence of a second stochastic element in the economy 
which prevents a one-to-one correspondence between the equilibrium price 
changes and the exogenous signal.10 
After each exogenous signal those investors gaining information, either 
by directly observing the signal or making inferences about the signal from 
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price, alter their prior beliefs about the future value(s) of the risky as-
set(s) in question. We do not specify the exact process by which investors 
form their new beliefs. 
Given the revised beliefs, individuals find their prior portfolio posi-
tion to be suboptimal. They use the financial security market to alter this 
current investment allocation. The actions of these investors create a new 
equilibrium with a new market-clearing price based on the new set of beliefs. 
This sequence of events is repeated as each investor becomes informed and 
results in a series of temporary equilibria between the initial equilibrium 
when no one is informed and the final equilibrium when all are informed. The 
process is illustrated below. 










The first trader receives the exogenous signal. 
Investor(s) alter beliefs and retrade. 
The market achieves equilibrium. 
The second trader receives the exogenous signal. 
Investor(s) alter beliefs and retrade. 
The market achieves equilibrium. 
The Nth (last) trader receives the exogenous signal. 
Investor(s) alter beliefs and retrade. 
The market achieves equilibrium. 
Each of the equilibria, with the exception of the last, is merely temporary. 
These equilibria last only until the next investor becomes informed. 
4. Market efficiency with gradual information dissemination. 
None of the efficiency concepts ment i oned earlier explicitly consi der the 
information dissemination process (although most make the implicit assumption 
that information is available simultaneously to all investors). Our posited 
market structure, on the other hand, considers this information diffusion pro-
cess as the central concern. Before we can address the issue of efficiency in 
this more general market setting, we must define an efficiency concept which 
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is consistent with the sequential receipt of informtion by the market partici-
pants. We offer such a definition below. Our interpretation retains the 
ex ante emphasis of Huber and is intentionally traditional in the sense that 
it requires identical prices and allocations under alternative information 
structures. 
A process determining final equilibrium prices and final 
allocations is efficient with respect to the information 
structure if, for every possible set of signal outcomes 
and for every possible sequence of signals received by the 
investors, final equilibrium prices and final allocations 
are identical to those prices and allocations which would 
be determined by the same process if the entire sequence 
of signals was received by each investor. 
This definition suggests the following scenario. Suppose we generate N sig-
nals and number them 1 through N. Further, suppose we arbitrarily assign the 
N investors numbers, 1 to N. Assume investor i observes only signal i. In an 
efficient market the final prices and allocations must be independent of the 
ordering of signals and individuals and identical to the prices and alloca-
tions which would exist if each investor observes all N signals. In this def-
inition we require nothing of the intermediate prices generated by the (N-1) 
temporary equilibria. This is consistent with other traditional efficiency 
concepts which are concerned only with the property of a stable equilibrium 
price. 
We posit this definition primarily as a 'strawman,' for the purpose of 
demonstrating the inadequacy of a dichotomous, efficient/inefficient designa-
tion in a market characterized by gradual information dissemination. Proper 
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consideration of this information diffusion process implies only very restric-
tive (and uninteresting) market settings achieve efficiency. We address this 
dilemma by proposing a measure of relative efficiency which is based on the 
sequential receipt of new data by investors. 
We demonstrate the restrictiveness of the conditions required to guaran-
tee efficiency in our market setting by focusing on a two date (t = 0,1) pure 
exchange economy with one risky and one riskfree asset. Individuals (i=1, 2, 
••• , N) are assumed to maximize the expected utility of date 1 wealth by 
selecting holdings of the riskless asset (bi) and the risky security (zi). 
The quantity zi is investor i's fractional holding of the total fixed supply 
of risky asset. 
Each unit of the riskless security held is a claim to r units of time t=1 
wealth. The uncertain t=1 value of the total supply of the risky asset is X. 
Individuals enter the economy with an endowment vector (bi, zi) which they 
consider optimal given their prior beliefs. The endowment vector, combined 
with the normalized price vector (1,p), determines investor wealth, 
(l) 
* * which acts as a constraint in the selection of an optimal portfolio (bi, zi). 
Each trader maximizes his expected utility of time t=l wealth, 
(2) 
subject to the budget constraint. By substituting for bi from equation (1) 
into equation (2), we may rewrite equation (2) as, 
~ 
Yi = rWi + zi (X- rp), (3) 
where (X - rp) represents the excess return earned for placing wealth at risk. 
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Further assumptions are: 
(A1) The capital. markets are frictionless; 
(A2) There are no short selling restrictions or taxes; 
(A3) All market participants are price takers; and 
(A4) Individuals' utility functions are bounded and exhibit nonsati-
ation and risk aversion. 
All of these are fairly standard in asset pricing literature. Assumption (A3) 
implies individuals behave as if their actions do not affect market price. 
The first order condition for the maximization of expected utility [see 
Mossin (1972)] is, 
dUvl dzi = E{Ui. [rWi+zi (X - rp)] (X - rp)} = O, (4) 
where E {•} is the expectations operator. Formally equation (4) is written, 
-Z ui [rWi + zi (X - rp)] (X- rp) fi (X) dX = 0, (5) 
where fi (X) is the density function determined by investor i' s beliefs. 
In order to illustrate the inadequacy of the traditional efficient/inef-
ficient designation in a sequential information receipt setting, we make an 
assumption about the density function in equation (5), fi (X). We assume that 
investor i believes that the end-of-period value of the risky security is de-
termined as if it were generated by a random process which is well approxi-
mated as a normal distribution, i.e., 
In this case the optimal holding of the risky security after the final trading 
opportunity (when everyone is informed) is, 
* - - -zi N = [Ei N(X) - rpN] I [V1· N (X)•R1· N(Y)], , , , , (6) 
where Ri,N(Y).::~·E{ut cYi)} I E{Ui (Y)}, the investor's risk aversion 
coefficient, and the subscript N denotes the final trading round values. This 
assertion is proven in the Appendix. 
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Our distributional assumption allows us to find closed form expressions for 
the investors' portfolio positions [equation (6)] and final equilibrium price. 
To write final market price, PN, we make use of the equilibrium clearing 
condition, 
N * 
L zi ,N = 1. 
i=i 
(7) 
Substituting for z* from equation (6) into equation (7) and solving for price 
i 
yields 
N N -1 
PN = (1/r) ~L. (Ei,N(X)/Ri,N(Y)•Vi,N(X))- 1] / _[L (Ri,N(Yi)"Vi,N(X)) (8) 
~=~ i=i 
Equation (8) is the price that exists after complete information dissemina-
tion. 
Our definition of efficiency requires that actual final equilibrium price 
equation (8), be identical to the price which would exist if each investor 
* received every signal. Suppose we denote this 'efficient-market' price as PN 
and the investor's beliefs and risk aversion upon observing all N signals as 
* - * -Ei,N (X), Vi,N (X) * -and Ri n (Y), , respectively. Before the market is effi-
* cient, i.e., PN = PN, it must be true that: 
Ei,N (X) = Ef,N (X); vi,N (X) = vf,NCX); and Ri,N (Y) = Rf,N (Y) 
for all investors.12 In addition, this statement must hold true independent 
of the order of information dissemination. We argue below that the market 
achieves this efficiency criterion only under very restrictive conditions. 
Suppose the information structure is such that the signals generated are 
not identical and the equilibrium price is not perfectly invertible13 on the 
information set of the informed. Individuals receive only one signal (of N) 
free of noise. In general investors' bel~efs, Ei N(X), V1· N(X) are not equal , , 
to Ef,N(X) and vf,NCX). 
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Suppose, on the other hand, the market structure is such that 
(a) N identical signals are generated (and investors know they are 
identical), or, 
(b) that price is perfectly invertible on the information set of 
the informed. 
Condition (a) or (b) is sufficient to assure investors' beliefs are the same 
~ if they receive each signal. In fact, if condition (a) or (b) holds inves-
tors do have access to all N signals. 
In addition to identical beliefs equation (8) requires that Ri,N(Y) = 
R~ N(Y·) for all investors independent of dissemination order. One situation l, l 
in which this is true is when investors' utility functions possess constant 
absolute risk aversion. 14 In this case Ri,N(Yi) = Ri for all levels of final 
wealth. However, if Ri,N(Yi) is not constant in Yi then, even with identical 
* signals, PN * PN. The inefficiency occurs because end-of-period wealth de-
pends on the individual's order in the information process. 
An individual who recognizes his priority position in the receipt of new 
data assumes a speculative position which (given reasonable assumptions about 
the information gathering process) increases, on average, that trader's wealth 
at the expense of his uninformed trading partners [see Jennings and Barry 
(1981)]. If we rewrite equation (3) as,15 
the relationship between Yi and Wi N is evident. Since Wi N depends on the , , 
order of information receipt, only condition (b) is sufficient to produce an 
efficient market. 
Condition (b) has problems also. Grossman and Stiglitz (1975), (1976) 
have demonstrated that perfect price invertibility is incompatible with market 
efficiency if it is costly to gather information. Therefore, if information 
acquisition is costly, complete efficiency cannot hold in the market we have 
presented. 
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Even if information is costless, Kihlstrom and Mirman (1975) and Grossman 
and Stiglitz prove that price is perfectly invertible if and only if a one-
to-one correspondence exists between the equilibrium price and the information 
set, i.e., if there is no noise in the pricing process. Potential sources of 
noise are suggested by Grossman and Stiglitz (supply uncertainty) and Goldman 
and Sosin (dissemination uncertainty). Thus, even if information is costless, 
market efficiency would hold only under the very restrictive condition that 
prices are fully invertible.16 
In this section we developed a traditional definition of efficiency which 
is consistent with gradual information dissemination. With this definition, 
price must be perfectly invertible on the information set of the informed be-
fore the market is efficient, and perfect invertibility is a highly restric-
tive condition. Thus, if we insist on the traditional efficient/inefficient 
dichotomy, the concept of market efficiency is uninteresting. What is needed 
is a measure of the degree of market efficiency. We suggest such a measure in 
the following section. 
5. A measure of market inefficiency 
The basic concept of information efficiency is that price adjusts quickly 
and completely to new data relevant to an asset's value. Existing research 
concentrates on the amount of price adjustment, ignoring the amount of time 
required for this adjustment to occur. We develop a measure of inefficiency 
which considers both the price and time dimensions. Thus, our metric is sen-
sitive to both how much and how rapidly prices adapt to new information. 
The previous section revealed two implications of the gradual dissemina-
tion of information for the concept of market efficiency. First we must be 
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sure our measure of inefficiency recognizes the ex ante stochastic nature of 
final market price. Each sequence of informatiop receipt by investors may 
produce a unique value fo~ PN. Therefore, prior to the complete dissemination 
of the new data, final market price is a random variable, PN. 
We also found that ex ante there is no reason to believe final equilib-
* 
rium price converges to the 'efficient-market' price, PN• Given certain as-
sumptions regarding investor behavior and the investors' information gathering 
system, Jennings ( 1981) shows, on average, final equilibrium price is 'cor-
rect', i.e., E(PN)=P~, but that PN = P; with probability zero. To be useful 
in a gradual information dissemination environment, any measure of ineffic:ien-
cy we propose must compare the relative efficiency of different pricing pro-
cesses which converge at different rates to different final equilibrium 
prices, none of which is the 'efficient-market' price. 
Figure 1 represents a hypothetical price adjustment path through time. 
Price adjusts from an initial stable equilibrium price existing prior to the 
release of the information, Po, to a final stable equilibrium price when 
everyone is informed, PN, over the time interval 0TN :::tN -to• In our nota-
tion, Pi is the equilibrium price which exists after individual i becomes in-
formed and ti is the time at which that investor receives the new data. I f 
0 < i < N the point (Pi,ti) represents a temporary equilibrium. The news be-
comes available at to, but the first investor does not become informed until 
In order to demonstrate our proposed measure of inefficiency (MI) we 
* initially examine price adjustment paths which converge to PN• This assump-
tion is later relaxed with only minor modifi cations in the concept of our 
me tric. 
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Figure 2 illustrates alternative price adjustment paths which represent: 
(A) smooth and rapid convergence towards PN, and; (B) irregular and slow con-
vergence to the same final price. (In drawing Figure 2 we have assumed the 
number of investors is large so that the step-function of price path of Figure 
1 may be approximated by a continuous curve.) We believe curve 'A' represents 
a more efficient price adjustment process. Process 'A' is 'close to' the new 
equilibirium price throughout most of the adjustment period and converges mo-
notonically to PN. Curve 'B', on the other hand, remains 'far from' PN during 
most of the adjustment process and wanders about ~omewhat randomly. In order 
to objectively gauge the relative efficiency of various price adjustment pro-
cesses, however, we must develop a rigorous measure of 'close to' and 'far 
from' as a function of time. 
The most extreme concept of efficiency is one in which market price in-
stantaneously changes to the new equilibrium level as soon as the information 
becomes available. In .our model this implies the market price moves from Po 
* to PN = PN at time to (when the first investor becomes informed) and that this 
price remains constant as each trader becomes informed, i.e., P1 = P2 = ••• = 
PN and to = t1• Figure 3 represents this 'most efficient' price adjustment 
process. This extreme form of efficiency occurs if the investor first in the 
know faces so little uncertainty about future price that he assumes a specula-
tive position large enough to force price to the new level or if the actions 
of the first informed investor tip-off the uninformed and they infer the new 
data from his actions. We use this 'most efficient' case as the standard 
against which ~e measure the relative efficiency of other price adjustment 
paths. 
Figure 4 uses a hypothetical price adjustment path to illustrate the in-
tuition behind our MI. The 'most efficient' price adjustment path is 
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represented by the line segments connecting point (Po, to), (PN, to) and (PN, 
tN). Our hypothesized price adjustment path is the curve between (Po, to) and 
(PN, tN). The shaded area represents the inefficiency of the actual price 
path relative to the 'most efficient' price path. Formally, 
t 
MI = JN I PN- p(t)ldt, (10) to 
where p(t) is the actual price at time t. Our measure is sensitive to: (1) 
the differences in the price with only a subset of the market informed, p(t), 
and the price with everyone informed, PN, and; (2) the length of time these 
price deviations persist. 
Our measure of inefficiency possesses the properties which Goldman and 
Sosin (1979, p.32) consider important: 
(P 1) Symmetry - equal absolute deviations of actual market price 
from the efficient market price should cause equal measures of inefficiency, 
(P2) Monotonicity - a larger absolute deviation from the efficient 
market price should cause a larger measure of inefficiency, 
(P3) Normalization - a zero deviation should imply a zero measure 
of inefficiency, 
(P4) Convexity - a doubling of the absolute deviation should at 
least (in our case, exactly) double the measure of inefficiency, and, 
(PS) Computational convenience - any measure of inefficiency should 
be straightforward to calculate. 
In addition, our MI extends properties (P2), (P3) and (P4) to the time 
dimension as well as the price dimension. That is, a price adjustment process 
which suffers the same price deviation for timeT' >Twill be more ineffi-
cient. 
Another i mportant property is : 
(P6) Insensitivity to units of measurement - changing the units of 
measurement for either the price or time dimensions should not affect the 
relative measure of inefficiency. 
Both the Goldman and Sosin measure (for the price dimension) and our MI 
possess this property. 
In the above analysis we take PN as given independently of the 
information dissemination process. The fourth section demonstrated that, in 
* general, PN is typically not equal to PN, the final equilibrium price that 
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would exist if each investor received every signal. Extending our analysis to 
consider this additional factor does not alter the intuition behind our MI. 
Figure 5 depicts the situation in which there is a permanent divergence 
* between PN and PN. Panel Sa illustrates the case where PN undershoots the 
efficient market price and panel Sb represents the case where the final equi-
* librium price overshoots PN. In either case the intuition behind our measure 
of inefficiency is captured in the formal definition, 
~ * MI =t!IPN- p(t)l dt. 
0 
(11) 
In equation (11) we change the upper limit of integration to reflect the fact 
that without another information event (or some other reason to induce trad-
* ing) any divergence between the market price and PN at time tN persists indef-
initely. 
There are two problems with the measure of inefficiency defined by 
equation (11). First, it provides an indefinite MI for any price adjustment 
* path in which PN * PN• This implies we are unable to compare the relative 
efficiency of two non-converging price adjustment paths. 
The second problem is more subtle. The reallocation of wealth which oc-
curs due to an investor possessing an information priority depends on exactly 
when the investor becomes informed. An investor receiving the news at time t 0 
earns a return on his information gathering activity for the entire period. 
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The investor informed partially through the dissemination process has a short-
er time period over which to earn his information priority return. Equation 
(11) ignores this reallocation process. We suggest a solution to these prob-
lems in the analysis later in this section. 
While equation (11) does not allow u_s to compare the efficiency of any 
two arbitrary price adjustment paths, it does permit us to make some dominance 
arguments. Using the dominance idea we are able to judge the relative effi-
ciency of select examples. 
* First, we find that •a price adjustment process that converges to PN is 
always more efficient than a process which does not converge. If price ad-
justment process A converges and process B does not then, 
It may 
i.e., B 
= t t£1p~- PB(t)ldt > JNIP~- PA(t)ldt. 
to 
be, however, that for any finite time period, 
t t tJfiP~ - PB(t) I dt < f~IP~- PA(t)ldt, 
0 
is more efficient than A. Thus traditional 
say tf > to, we have 
definitions of market 
ficiency which require equivalence between the equilibrium price and some 
ef-
efficient-market price are correct only in the limit. In the short run a non-
converging price adjustment path may be preferred to one which converges. 
Figure 6 illustrates this concept. 
We may also use a dominance argument to judge the relative efficiency of 
two non-converging price adjustment paths under certain conditions. In Figure 
7 price adjustment path A dominates (in efficiency) path B since PA(t) is 
* everywhere closer to PN than PB(t). We are unable to judge, however, the rel-
ative efficiency of two non-converging price adjustment paths which intersect 
at any time t > to with the concept represented by equation (11). In order to 
extend our analysis to any arbitrary information dissemination processes we 
must modify our MI. 
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Specifically we must alter the definition of our MI to assure a finite 
integral and to consider the timing of pricing deviations. One method which 
overcomes both of these problems is to examine the present value of price 
deviations per unit time, i.e., 
where P is an appropriate discount rate. With equation (12) those deviations 
occurring far in the future receive little (in the limit zero) weight. While 
(12) resolves the problem that MI might not be comparable over arbitrarily 
large time intervals, it demands a rational choice of the discount rate p. 
* One could argue that to the extent that p(t) differs from PN there is an ag-
* gregate misallocation of wealth that is linear in lPN -p(t)l. The misallo-
cated wealth could be invested in the riskless asset, at least, so that the 
risk! ess rate of return could be justified in equation (12). Ultimately the 
choice of an "appropriate" P depends on societal values regarding the choice 
between inefficiency today versus inefficiency tomorrow. 
We have, in equation (12), developed a measure of inefficiency that con-
siders several important factors in determining the relative efficiency of a 
securities market. Our MI introduces the time dimension into the efficiency 
concept and handles its implications. In the following section we examine 
some of the economic variables which influence a market's relative efficiency 
as measured by (12). 
6. Economic variable influencing market efficiency. 
In the previous section we developed our measure of market inefficiency. 
This section investigates some of the economic variables affecting the degree 
of efficiency. If the market is unbiased in its estimate of the impact of new 
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data, relative efficiency is determined by the rapidity of price adjustment. 
The speed at which prices adapt to the gradual dissemination of additional in-
formation is examined in Jennings and Barry (1981). Much of what we have to 
say here is contained in that paper in more detail. 
The rapidity of price adjustment at any point in time is graphically por-
trayed by the slope of the price adjustment curve. If the slope is 'large' 
the adaptation of the price to the data is 'rapid'. We can divide the eco-
nomic factors determining the shape of the price adjustment curve into market 
characteristics and individual investor attributes. 
Individuals perceiving that they possess priority in the receipt of in-
formation speculate. 11 The rapidity of price adjustment depends, in part, on 
the amount of speculative behavior. Significant speculation by the informed 
investors leads to rapid price adjustment. The size of the speculative posi-
tion assumed by those traders in-the-know depends on their perceived ability 
to forecast future price. Many economic variables determine an investor's 
forecasting ability. Some of these variables are the type of signal, inves-
tors' knowledge about the economic attributes of his peers, the perceived re-
liability of the new data, the degree of dissemination uncertainty and the in-
dividual's perceived social weight in the pricing process. A factor not di-
rectly affecting the speculative activity of an investor but which affects 
portfolio positions (and, therefore, equilibrium price) is the information 
content of the signal for both the investor receiving the data and those trad-
ers who must infer the news from observing the price reaction. 
Investors with an informational advantage are better off if the signal 
generating process produces identical signals for each trader. With identical 
signals the informed market participant can more accurately estimate the im-
pact of the signal on other traders who subsequently receive the signal. This 
------------------------------~~-----~-~ ~ 
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knowlege permits the informed investor to improve his estimate of future 
price. 
The level of knowledge possessed by an investor about the economic char-
acteristics of his fellow traders also influences the size of the speculative 
positions taken. A trader with considerable knowledge concerning the current 
beliefs, risk aversion and the information gathering process of his trading 
partners assumes a larger speculative position than an individual without such 
knowledge. 
The impact of additional information on an investor's beliefs depends on 
the perceived accuracy (precision) of the new data. If the additional infor-
1 
mation is perceived as possessing high (low) precision the investor assumes a 
large (small) speculative position. 
An investor with a good idea of where he stands in the information dis-
semination process can clearly assume a larger speculative position than if he 
is unsure about his priority. If an investor believes that he may enjoy an 
informational advantage over no one he can ill-afford to speculate since he 
may be unable to rid himself of his extreme portfolio without suffering a 
loss. 
In Jennings and Barry (1981) we show that the perceived social weight of 
an individual in the process determining future prices is important in decid-
ing the speculative activity of the investor. Those investors who believe 
they are relatively important in setting price assume large speculative posi-
tions, while those who believe they are less crucial to the process are con-
tent with less speculation. This social weight is measured by the investor's 
subjective estimate of the correlation of his belief about future market price 
with the future price. The larger the absolute value of this correlation co-
efficient, the larger the speculation and the more rapid the price adjustment. 
26 
A signal with substantial information content for the recipient is one 
which contains information 'different' from the prior beliefs. For example 
consider the case in which individuals are Bayesian in their use of new data, 
the random process of concern is normally distributed with unknown mean ~ 
and known variance, and the new information can be thought of a sample from a 
normal process with the same unknown mean and a known sampling variance. An 
observed samp~e mean differing greatly from the individual's prior belief 
about ~ causes significant revision of that prior. If the sample mean is 
equal to the prior belief the investor's posterior expectation about the un-
known mean is identical to the prior. Thus a signal with significant informa-
tion content causes more rapid price adjustment. 
One of the most important factors in determining the rapidity of price 
adjustment is the ability of an investor not receiving the exogenous signal to 
learn from price adjusts more rapidly than a market ignoring the information 
content of equilibrium price. In a sphoisticated market every individual re-
sponds to each signal. Thus, the receipt of a signal favorable (unfavorable) 
to fUture asset value by any investor tends to cause an increase (decrease) in 
demand for every investor. On the other hand, in a naive setting only the re-
cipient of the signal alters his demand curve. 
All of these factors are important in determining the shape of the price 
adjustment curve. Factors favorable to more rapid price adjustment tend to 
make the actual price path look like the 'most efficient' price adjustment 
path. 
7. Summary and empirical implications. 
In this paper we extend the theoretical examination of market efficiency 
to a market structure in which information is disseminated gradually to the 
investors. We demonstrate that the traditional definition of market 
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efficiency as the equivalence between equilibrium price and an 'efficient-
market price' is not useful in this more general market setting. In place of 
the traditional efficient/inefficient dichotomy we developed a measure of rel-
ative efficiency. Our measure of inefficiency considers both the price and 
the time dimension in the price adjustment process. Specifically our MI is 
the present value of the deviations in the actual price adjustment path from 
the 'most efficient' price adjustment path per unit time. Formally this is, 
j -pt * MI =t e I PN- p(t)ldt, 
0 
where to is the time at which the information becomes available, 
and 
P is an appropriate discount rate, 
P~ is the final equilibrium price which would exist if every investor 
received each signal. 
p(t) is the actual market price at time t. 
This measure is sensitive to both how much and how quickly prices adjust to 
new data. Finally we discuss economic factors, both individual investor at-
tributes and market characteristics, which influence the relative efficiency 
of a market place. 
The next step in the process of learning more about the concept of effi-
ciency is to attempt to use some of the concepts of this paper in empirical 
efficiency tests. One obvious drawback is that to calculate our MI you must 
know the equilibrium price that would exist with complete dissemination of all 
* data, PN. Patell and Wolfson (1979) and Hillmer and Yu (1979) provide empiri-
cal techniques which estimate the point at which a market reaches a new equi-
librium. Empirical research may be able to assume that PN is an unbiased es-
* timator of PN or that signals are identical for certain information events 
which may allow us to estimate the relative efficiency of the market's reac-
tion to various information events. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. The unmodified use of the term "efficient" in this paper refers to in-
formation (as opposed to economic) efficiency. 
2. Despite the conclusions of Stiglitz (1981), many economists consider the 
competitiveness of the financial market to be linked to the economic 
efficiency of the economy as a whole. 
3. See Fama (1970) for a metaphorical description of "the market." 
4. Thus the name action efficiency. If the market is efficient the investor 
takes no portfolio action. 
S. See Kihlstrom and Mirman (1975) for a formal derivation of the necessary 
and sufficient conditions for the uninformed to learn the information set 
of the informed from equilibrium price. 
I 6. The efficiency concept introduced in Diamond and Verrecchia (1981) ap-
pears to be the first definition allowing a price adjustment following 
the public announcement of information. We further demonstrate the inap-
propriateness of a strict price equivalency by introducing sequential in-
formation dissemination. 
7. The investor first receiving the new information has a competitive advan-
tage from being first in the know. Jennings and Barry (1981) demon-
strate this advantage. 
8. Patel! and Wolfson (1979) and Hilmer and Yu (1979) offer empirical evi-
dence that the reaction of investors to an information event is indeed 
sequential. 
9. Allowing for the possibility that investors choose to remain uninformed 
then investors are informed one at a time until all who wish to be in-
formed are informed. 
10. Typically it is assumed that endowments of the various assets are random. 
In this market setting we could also allow non-information related 
trades, i.e., trades due to consumption, shifting, preferences or liquid-
ity. Either approach would add the required noise to the price system. 
11. Thus we take the consumption and information expenditures as given. 
12. We dismiss as unlikely the possibility of exactly offsetting differences 
in Ei,N(X), Vi,N(X) and Ri,N(Yi) from their appropriate values such that 
PN = P~. 
13. I n the Grossman and St i glitz and Kihl strom and Mirman sense. 
14. See Pratt (1964). 
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15. We are ignoring the (assumed) minor real time it takes for information to 
be disseminated in the market place. If an investor's planning horizon 
is one year and the information is fully disseminated within a day or two 
then, multiplying WiN and PN by the annual riskless rate of return, r, 
' is clearly an approximation. For illustrative purposes we believe it is 
close enough. 
16. Barry (1979) has argued that the information requirements for fully in-
vertible prices in the Kihlstrom-Mirmen market are extreme. 
17. Speculative behavior is defined as an individual assuming a portfolio 
position he would not hold if there were not other trading opportunities 
prior to the distribution of final wealth. 
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